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IN TUB
SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

EARL C. FREIS,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
Case No.
vs,
14184
WHEELER MACHINERY COMPANY,
Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from the judgment on a jury verdict
in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake
County State of Utah, the Honorahle James S. Sawaya, District
Judge.

The verdict returned and judgment thereon found

no cause of action by plaintiff against defendant.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The matter came on regularly for jury trial before
the Honorable James S. Sawaya, District Judge, on May 1,
197 5 and continued for a total of four days ending on May

6, 1975. At the close of the trial, the jury returned a
verdict of no cause of action against the defendant, and
judgment was duly entered by the trial court accordingly.
Subsequently, plaintiff, by and through counsel, filed a
Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict or in the
Alternative for a New Trial.

Said Motion was denied by

the trial court after hearing on May 23, 1975, and on June
18, 1975, plaintiff filed Notice of Appeal in this action,
and the case is now before this Honorable Court pursuant
to that Notice of Appeal.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of the lower court's Verdict
and Judgment, or in the Alternative for a New Trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This action was brought to recover for personal injury
sustained by plaintiff in a two-freight truck accident
which occurred on U.S. Highway 89 at a point just north of
the Junction 273 S.R. which is the old highway between
Kaysville and Farmington where it crosses U.S. Highway 89.
The accident occurred when the southbound tractor pulling
a Peterbilt lowboy trailer loaded with a D-8 Caterpillar
and a detached dozer blade driven by Rodney K. Bosch,
defendant's driver, collided with the rear and left side
of a Western Gillette truck-tractor pulling two trailers

• -.
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under the control and operation of the plaintiff as an
employee for Western Gillette.

The plaintiff and the

Western Gillette truck had been stalled behind traffic
which had backed up following an accident at the above
referred to Junction.
At trial, substantial credible and uncontroverted
evidence was adduced by plaintiff, including testimony and
admissions from defendant's driver, Rodney K. Bosch, together
with Officer John Morton and Dave Lord, an accident reconstruction specialist and

Exhibits

provided

by

Howell

Ujifusa, an expert photographer, all of which required a
clear conclusion that the above described accident directly
and proximately resulted from the negligence of defendant's
driver, Rodney K. Bosch.
the defendant.

Such evidence was not rebutted by

Further substantial credible and uncontro-

verted evidence was adduced by plaintiff showing that the
injuries to plaintiff's cervical spine resulted from the
said accident.

Included was the testimony of Doctor Gary

F. Larsen, plaintiff's treating physician, Doctor Thomas
D. Noonan who independantly examined the plaintiff, Mr.
James W. Dinger and Mr. Courtney Bluck who were co-drivers
soon after the accident, and the plaintiff, Mr. Earl C.
Freis.

At the conclusion of the presentation of evidence

in this case, plaintiff moved the trial court for a direct
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verdict in favor of the plaintiff and against defendant.
Said motion for directed verdict was denied with no
explanation.
Subsequent to giving of the court!s instructions, the
jury retired for deliberation and later returned a verdict
of no cause of action, and judgment was thereon was duly
entered.
Subsequent to the entry of judgment, plaintiff timely
moved the trial court, pursuant to their provisions of rules
50(b) and 59(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,. for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or in the alternative for
a new trial.

The trial court by order denied such motion

after hearing on the 29th day of May, 1975.

On June 18,

1975, plaintiff filed his Notice of Appeal in this action,
and the case is now before this Honorable Court pursuant
to that Notice of Appeal.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
TUB TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO
GRANT PLAINTIFFfS MOTION FOR DIRECTED
VERDICT AND PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT,
OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR A NEW TRIAL.
At the conclusion of evidence in the instant case,
plaintiff moved the trial court for a directed verdict in
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favor of plaintiff and against defendant which motion was
denied by the court without assigning any reason for its
refusal.

Upon the return of the jury verdict of no cause

of action, plaintiff timely moved the trial court pursuant
to the provisions of Rules 50 (b) and 59(a) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure for a judgment notwithstanding
the verdict or in the alternative a new trial.

The trial

court denied such motion upon hearing thereof on May 23,
1975.

The refusals of the trial court to grant plaintifffs

motion for a directed verdict, for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict and for a new trial constituted clear error,
and the error is of such magnitude as to require a reversal
and a remand of this case to the trial court for a new trial
or for other appropriate action.
It is well established as a matter of law that a Motion
for a Directed Verdict and a Motion for Judgment N.O.V.
properly lie and should be granted by the trial court in a
case where there are no controverted issues of fact upon
which reasonable men could differ and where, without weighing
the credibility of the witnesses, there can be but one reasonable conclusion as to the verdict.

Brady v. Southern Rail-

road, 320 U.S. 476, 64 S. Ct. 232, 88 L. Ed. 329 (1943);
Shafer v. Mountain States Tel. $ Telegraph Co.,

33 5 F. 2d 444

(9th Cir. 1964); Ozark Air Lines, Inc. v. Larimer, 352 F. 2d
9

(8th Cir. 1965); Patterson v. Pizitz, Inc., 353 F. 2d 267
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(5th Cir. 1965); Jopek v. New Court Central Railroad, 353
F. 2d 778 (3rd Cir. 1965); Herron v. Maryland Gas Co.,
3457 F. 2d 357 (5th Cir. 1965); Adams v. Powell, 351 F.
2d 213 (10th Cir. 1965); Pinehurst, Inc. v. Schlamowitz,
351 F. 2d 509 (4th Cir. 1965); 5A Moore's Federal Practice,
Sec, 50.02(1) et seq.

See also, Pence v. United States,

316 U. S. 332, 62 S. Ct. 1080, 86 L. Ed. 1510 (1942) and
Pollesche v. TransAmerican Ins. Co., 2 7 Utah 2d 430, 49 7
P. 2d 236 (1972).
In the leading case of Brady v. Southern Railroad,
supra, the United States Supreme Court had before it the
question of when and under what circumstances a Motion
for a Directed Verdict is properly granted.

In that

landmark case, the Supreme Court announced the standard
in the following terms:
When the evidence is such that without
weighing the credibility of the witnesses there
can be but one reasonable conclusion as to the
verdict, the court should determine the proceedings by non-suit, directed verdict or otherwise
in accordance with the applicable practice without
submission to the jury, or by judgement notwithstanding the verdict. By such direction of the
trial the result is saved from mischance of
speculation over legally unfounded claims (320
U.S. at 479-480).
5A Moore?s Federal Practice, Sec. 50.02(1) states the
above rule in somewhat more succinct fashion:
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Although the language of the opinions
concerning directed verdicts is extremely
varied, it is now clear that a verdict will
normally be directed where both the facts and
the inferences to be drawn from the facts
point so strongly in favor of one party that
the court believes that reasonable men could
not come to a different conclusion
(At p.
2320) .
It is now well established, in applying the above
rule, that an appellate court, in reviewing the action of
the lower court on a Motion for a Directed Verdict, must
consider the evidence in its strongest light in favor of
the party against whom the Motion for a Directed Verdict
was made, and give him the advantage of every fair and
reasonable intendment that the evidence can justify.

Upon

such a consideration, if the appellate court concludes
that the facts adduced in evidence and the inferences to
be drawn from the facts point to any conclusion so strongly
that the court concludes that reasonable men could not come
to a different conclusion, the appellant court is justified
in overturning any ruling by the trial court on a Motion
for a Directed Verdict which is adverse to or contra that
required conclusion.

Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide

Corp., 370 U. S. 690, 82 S. Ct. 1404, 8 L. Ed. 2d 777
(1962); Webb v. Illinois Central Railroad, 552 U. S. 512,
77 S. Ct. 451, 1 L. Ed. 503 (1957); Girardi v. Gates
Rubber Co., 325 P. 2d 196 (9th Cir. 1963); Schnee v.

Southern Pacific Railroad, 186 F. 2d 745 (9th Cir. 1951);
Austad v. Austad, 2 Utah 2d 49, 269 P. 2d 284.
The Utah Supreme Court has stated the above rules
as follows:
In the time-honored and universally accepted
rule that a finding or a verdict must be supported
by substantial evidence, the modifying adjective
"substantial" has been used advisedly to indicate
a higher degree of proof than just any evidence
of any kind. The requirement is that the evidence
must be sufficient in amount and credibility that,
when considered in connection with the other evidence and circumstances shown in the case, would
justify some but no necessarily all, reasonable
minds acting fairly thereon, to believe it to be
the truth. And conversely, if when so considered
it appears to be so plainly unsubstantial or inconsequential that the court is convinced that no
jury acting rairly~~and reasonably could so believe
i* > it cannot properly be regarded as substantial
evidence. UtaH" State Road Commission v. The Steele
Ranch, 533 P. 2d 888^1975) (emphasis added)
The following observations are noteworthy about this
rule:
1.

The evidence must be substantial in support of

the verdict or a higher degree of proof than just any evidence of any kind.
2.

The evidence which supported the verdict must be

considered in connection with other evidence.
3.

If the evidence which supports the verdict is

plainly so unsubstantial or inconsequential that the court
is convinced that no jury acting fairly and reasonably
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could so believe it,

it cannot properly be regarded as

substantial evidence and the court may reverse the jury
verdict.
Applying the above cases and authority to the case
at bar, it is clear that the trial court erred in refusing
to grant plaintiff's motion for a directed verdict and
plaintiff's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
In this case, the facts adduced at trial and the inferences
appropriately drawn from those facts, point so strongly
in favor of the plaintiff that it is inconceivable that
reasonable men, in considering those facts, could conclude
other than that plaintiff was entitled to a verdict in
judgment against the defendant.
NEGLIGENCE AS A MATTER OF LAW
In the instant case, the undisputed facts disclosed at
trial reveal:
1.

That the accident which is the subject matter

of this lawsuit occurred on U. S. Highway 89 north of the
Junction of 273 S. R. where the old highway between Farmington
and Kaysville crosses the said highway at the hour of approximately 10:00 a.m. in the morning on January 23, 1973.
2.

That defendant's truck-tractor pulling a Peterbilt

lowboy tailer loaded with a D-8 Caterpillar with a detached
dozer blade driver by defendant's driver, Rodney K. Bosch,
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•*-.. * failed to stop behind the backed up traffic at that Junction,
•• " mounted the island separating the four lanes of traffic in
an effort to avoid hitting the automobiles behind plaintiff's
vehicle, and failing in that effort about the time that it
was passing plaintifffs vehicle was thrown against the rearv- end left side of the Western Gillette truck and trailers
> being operated by the plaintiff, Mr. Earl C. Freis.

(R. pp.

'• • . 1-2, 5, 55 para. 3, 81 para. 1 under first defense, Tr. pp.
\. 43-58, 61-67)
• \* ..

At trial the defendant's driver, Rodney K. Bosch, made

3

• ' what amounts to an admission of liability and culpability in
the failure to stop behind the backed up traffic when
* analyzed in light of the statements made by the accident
reconstruction specialist, Dave Lord.

Rodney K. Bosch

.wi admitted in his testimony that he saw the backed up traffic
" approximately three hundred feet before reaching it, (Tr.
'.ki p. 422, Ins. 23-30), yet he testified that he never hit
his brakes until the last one hundred feet before reaching
';' the said traffic.

(Tr. p. 49, Ins. 20-23) Mr. Dave Lord

... \ on the other hand testified that had the defendant's driver
f

? * *

, attempted a normal stop on dry pavement on that road under

. **. those circumstances that he could have stopped the vehicle
*

:- in one hundred and twenty-five feet (125 ft.) after having
'

taken seventy-four feet (74 ft.) indiscriminate reaction

.*'• time at the speed of fifty miles per hour (50 mph) . (Tr.pvl64;

Ins. 9-12, 176 Ins. 11-24)

If the total footage for reaction

time and stopping the vehicle on that slope on dry pavement
were totalled, it would amount to one hundred and ninetynine feet (199 ft.) for stopping the vehicle at fifty miles
per hour (50 mph) (125 ft, + 74 ft, * 199 ft.).

If the

defendant's driver saw the backed up traffic three hundred
feet (300 ft.) away, he failed to act for one hundred and
one feet (101 ft.).
The plaintiff in Benson v. Denver and Rio-Grande Western
Railroad Company, 4 Utah 2d 38, 286 Pt. 2d 790 (1955) was
held to be contributorily negligent as a matter of law when
he drove into the side of a railroad engine at a speed of
fifteen to twenty miles an hour during a snow storm in which
he was only able to see for twenty-five to thirty feet at
the crossing where the accident occurred.

The plaintiff

admitted that he Knew the area and had driven it many, many
times.

The court held on page 44,

"We believe all reasonable minds would
agree that if plaintiff had looked he could
have seen the approaching train in time to
stop and avoid the collision, unless he was
traveling too fast under the existing conditions to do so"
Then quoting from the rule set forth in Dally v. Midwestern
Dairy Products Company, 80 Utah 133, 15 P. 2d 309, At p. 310,
the court stated it was committed to the Dally court's rule,
to wit,
-11-

,*"• ..

M

In this jurisdiction the doctrine is
established that it is negligence as a matter
of law for a person to drive an automobile
upon a traveled public highway, used by
vehicles and pedestrians, at such a rate of
speed that said automobile cannot be stopped
within the distance at which the operator of
said car is able to see objects upon the highway in front of him."
The Benson court concluded that since the plaintiff

>> was driving fifteen miles per hour (15 mph) and could see
thirty feet (30 ft.) and with a reaction time of three
fourths (3/4) of a second he would travel sixteen feet (16
ft.) before applying the brakes and would need thirteen feet
(13 ft.) to stop on good dry pavement and not less than
eighteen feet (18 ft.) on wet roads after applying the brake
and since under those circumstances it would be impossible
for the plaintiff to stop short of 34.5 feet he was negligent
as a matter of law for traveling at that speed. Supra at p. 44
Defendant's driver, Mr. Bosch, further admitted that he
saw the patrol car about one fourth of a mile before arriving
at the patrol car.

(Tr. p. 47, Ins. 23-30, p. 48 Ins. 1-5,

9-27),
In dispute is a question of whether or not the officer
was standing there doing nothing or giving hand signals.
. According to the testimony of Rodney Bosch, he didn't know
-* that the officer was doing anything beyond displaying his
emergency lights.

(Tr. p. 408 Ins. 4-20)
' -12-

According to the

testimony of Officer Morton who was at the scene and in the
position and was in fact the one who was signaling there at
the crest of the hill prior to the accident, he, Officer
Morton, was giving hand signals in addition to displaying
emergency lights.

(Tr. p. 83 Ins. 5-17)

Mr. Howell Uji Fusa was employed by the plaintiff to
take pictures to show the earliest point in which traffic
could be seen as well as the patrol car.

Mr. Uji Fusa provided

slides for the jury to see and then took corresponding
pictures of the slides and had them blown up and placed on
plaintiff's Exhibit Number 19.

Plaintiff's Exhibit Number

15, however, is one of those pictures which is a point three
tenths (3/10) of a mile prior to arriving at the point designated as the tail end of the backed up traffic.

At that point

one can see from viewing that picture that a great deal is
visible at three tenths (3/10) of a mile prior to arriving
at the point where defendant's driver had to take evasive
action.

(Tr. p. 102 Ins. 6-15, 21-30; p. 103 Ins. 1-5.

Said

Exhibit 15 shows the truck and the patrol car and what is
between.

Also see Plaintiff's Exhibit 16)

Officer John Morton further testified that he went back
to the scene on April 1, 1975 and took measurements.

He

testified that according to his recollection of where the
backed up traffic was at the time of the accident there was
approximately three tenths (3/10) of a mile or about fifteen
-13-

hundred and eighty-four feet (1584 ft,) that one could see
the backed up traffic before having to take evasive action.
(Tr. p. 75 Ins. 2-15)

From the testimonies of the above

referred to witnesses including the defendants driver, it
should be abundantly clear that defendant's driver, Rodney
K. Bosch, is negligent as a matter of law.

Itrs not merely

from his own testimony but also from the corroborating and
supplimenting testimonies of other people around.

These

evidences constitute a mass of credible and uncontroverted
evidence that permit no other possible conclusion.
Certainly there is no evidence that the plaintiff, Mr.
Earl C. Freis, was in any way negligent and contributed to
his own injury, in that it remains uncontroverted that his
truck was stationary and that he never knew what hit him.
On the other hand, defendants driver, Mr. Rodney K.
Bosch, admitted that he knew he had a heavier load on and
that it would take a longer distance to stop and that his
speed was too fast to stop in the distance required.

He

testified that he had experience with driving heavier loads
and knew that they were harder to handle and that he was
carrying approximately one hundred and twenty thousand
pounds (120,000 lbs.) of gross.

(Tr. p. 50 Ins. 4-16; p.

52 Ins. 3-6, 10-12; p. 54 Ins. 6-23; p. 55 Ins. 4-30; p.
56 Ins. 1-30; p. 50 Ins. 24-26)
should the duty of care.

As the risk increases so

As a matter of public policy,
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when a company uses the highways to transport extra heavy
equipment, the risk should be borne by the company rather
than the other individuals on the highway.
Merely because he was traveling within the speed limit
will offer no comfort since one can commit negligence while
driving within the speed limit.

Lochead v. Jensen, 42 Utah

99, 129 Pt. 347. UCA 41-6-46 provides:
1. No person shall drive a vehicle on a
highway at a speed greater than is reasonable
and prudent under the conditions and having
regard to the actual, and potential hazards then
existing. In every event, speed shall be so
controlled as may be necessary to avoid colliding
with any person, vehicle, or other conveyance on
or entering the highway in complicance with legal
requirements and the duty of all persons to use
due care.
3. The driver of every vehicle shall, consistent with the requirements of subdivision (1)
of this section, drive at an appropriately reduced
speed when approaching and crossing an intersection
or railway grade, when approaching and going around
a curve, when approaching a hill crest, when traveling upon any narrow or~winding~~road, and when special
hazard exists with regard to pedestrians or other
traffic or by reason of weather or highway conditions,
(emphasis added)
(Also see the rule applied in Henderson v. Meyer, 533 P.
2d 290 (1975) and Wcineg Brothers v. Manning, 1 Utah 2d 101,
262 P. 2d 491, 1953 5 Am.Jur. Automobiles, Sec. 167; 60A
CIS Motor Vehicles, Sec. 284.)
CAUSATION AS A MATTER OF LAW
The undisputed facts disclosed at trial further reveal
that the said accident which is the subject matter of this
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lawsuit caused injury to plaintiff's neck.

All medical

testimony adduced at trial from Doctors Gary F. Larsen and
Thomas D. Noonan remains credible and incontroverted as to
the causal relationship between the accident and the plaintiff's injury.

Both doctors agree that plaintiff suffered

an aggravation or injury which was superimposed upon an
existing condition of calcium buildup or arthritis in plaintiff's neck.
The only controversy between the said doctors relates
to the extent of the damage caused by the accident.

Doctor

Noonan on the one hand believed that plaintiff would likely
have required surgery to his neck at some point in time to
correct the arthritic condition irregardless of whether the
accident occurred, but in the final analysis admits that
that condition was aggravated by the accident.

Doctor Larse

on the other hand claims that because the condition was
asymptomatic with no neurological signs and with only a
static condition of osteophyte calcium buildup prior to
the accident, then shortly after the accident neurological
signs began to appear, that the accident had to have caused
substantial injury or damage.(Note that Dr. Noonan agrees wi
Doctor JLarsen that the condition was a rather static type of
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condition.

Nor does Doctor Noonan dispute the fact that

the accident itself must have caused significant and substantial damage.) (Tr. Doctor Gary F. Larsen p. 196 Ins.
14-25; p. 197 Ins. 2-4, 16-38; p. 216 Ins. 1-11; p. 217
Ins. 1-9; p. 233 Ins. 7-27; p. 248 Ins. 21-30; p. 249 Ins.
1-4; p. 258 Ins. 11-21.

Doctor Thomas D. Noonan p. 392

Ins. 9-30; p. 393 Ins. 1-8; p. 375 Ins. 7-19; p. 368 Ins.
24-28; p. 403 Ins. 17-30; p. 404 Ins. 1-19.

Also see

Plaintiff's Exhibit 29 and Plaintiff's Exhibit 30)
The testimony of Doctor Larsen was very credible and
uncontroverted by evidences adduced by the defendant.
These were the statements made by the doctor concerning
the real nature of plaintiff's pain.

He describes as

indicated above how plaintiff had complaints of pain beginning immediately after the accident and how he discovered
as time went on through more objective neurological tests
that the plaintiff's pains were genuine including headaches,
neck pain, shoulder and arm pain, and loss of grip.

(Tr.

p. 196 Ins. 14-25; p. 197 Ins. 2-4, 16-28; p. 198 Ins. 2130; p. 199 Ins. 1-9; p. 211 Ins 23-30; p. 212 Ins. 3-12,
19-24; p. 212 Ins. 28-30; p. 213 Ins. 1-3, 18-28; p. 214
Ins. 3-7, 11-13)
In addition the doctor, just prior to performing the
operation, performed a myelogram test wherein dye is put
in the spine and watched through X-rays to discover
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intrustions into the spinal canal.

In this test the doctor

discovered that there was in fact an intrusion in the spina
canal, but due to its appearance the intrusion did not
appear on the X-ray and it was concluded by the doctor to
be a disk which is made of soft material which does not
appear as opposed to the harder materials of calcium and
bones which do appear.
If it were a disk, the doctor stated that it would be
more of an acute process as compared to the more chronic
problem of osteophyte buildup.

(Tr. p. 226 Ins. 5-24; p.

230 Ins. 17-30; p. 231 Ins. 2-14, 23-35; p. 232 Ins. 17-23;
p. 2 33 Ins. 7-27; p. 3 58 Ins. 11-21) *
The credibility of the histories of the accident and
the resulting pain taken by Doctor Gary F. Larsen and
Doctor Thomas D. Noonan were reinforced by the ] testimonies c
individuals who drove and rode with Mr. Freis before and
after the accident.

The first witness was James W. Dinger

who had been with Mr. Freis for a period of two (2) months
prior to the accident and who rode with Mr. Freis for one
(1) month following the accident.

It is apparent from his

testimony that prior to the accident, Mr. Freis was a very
productive individual who held up his end of the driving
time as the two individuals, Mr. Dinger and Mr. Freis, rode
together as co-drivers for Western Gillette.
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Mr. Dinger testified, however, that shortly after the
accident on a trip to St. Louis, Missouri, and returning
therefrom Mr. Freis began to complain of headaches and
requested that Mr. Dinger do the driving and from that
time on through the next month until February 23rd, the
relationship between the two men began to deteriorate.
The reason given by Mr. Dinger was that Mr. Freis became
very irritable; he began to complain of headaches and began
to try to sluff off his driving on to Mr. Dinger.

When

the relationship deteriorated, the two men parted company
by making a change through a trade of partners with
another driving team.

(Tr. p. 312 Ins. 7-30; p. 313, Ins.

1-30; p. 314 Ins. 9-14; p. 311 Ins. 12, 13, 16-18)
Thereafter with the new driving team Mr. Freis continued
to have his problems as was testified by Mr. Courtney Bluck
who remained with him during the next year.

Mr. Bluck

testified that Mr. Freis suffered from headaches and pains.
He said that Mr. Freis tended to hold the team longer at
the motels that they were staying at and began to stay at
home so that Mr. Bluck had to obtain driving partners from
the extra board at Western Gillette.

(Tr. p. 322 Ins. 23-

28; p. 323 Ins. 16-22; p. 324 Ins. 9-26; p. 325 Ins. 12-26)
The testimony of these two drivers remains substantially
uncontroverted by any evidence or cross-examination by the
defense.

-19-

Also submitted into evidence were the records of Mr.
Freis days off during 1973. A chart entitled Chronology
of Mr. FreisT Driving Position was submitted into evidence
setting forth the months and the changes in the driving
position starting with Mr. James W. Dinger and continuing
on through the year of 1975. Also a part of that chart
included the accounting of Mr. Freis1 time off on a monthby-month basis showing a comparison of the years 1971
through 1973.
It is apparent from that portion of the chart having
to do with the time off that there was a dramatic change in
Mr, Freis' work productivity between 1972 and 1973. (See
Plaintiff's Exhibit Number 29) The information placed
upon this chart was taken from the records kept over the
years by Mr. Freis collectively designated as Plaintiff's
Exhibit 30.

What these records and this chart show is a

dramatic change in Mr. Freis' work productivity showing
that something cataclysmic occurred in January of 1973.
Testimony of Mr. James W. Dinger, Mr. Courtney Bluck, and
the Exhibits placed into evidence during the testimony of
Mr. Earl C. Freis (Plaintiff's Exhibit 29 and Plaintiff's
Exhibit 30)

were substantially uncontroverted by any

evidence produced by the defendant.

Also from the testimon

of Mr. Freis, we discover that the plaintiff was very
physically active in athletics and sports prior to the
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accident, but became very inactive thereafter.

Pictures

showing Mr. Freis' athletic involvement were Plaintiff's
Exhibits 31-34.

Plaintiff's Exhibits 29-34 were submitted

into evidence during the testimony of Mr. Earl C. Freis.
(Tr. pp. 277, 281, 282, 430)

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL
Coincident with plaintiff's Motion for Judgment N.O.V.,
plaintiff also filed a Motion for a New Trial which motion was
also heard on the 23rd day of May, 1975.

The motion for the

new trial was also denied on May 29, 1975 by order of the
court and without any explanation.

Thereafter, plaintiff filed

his Notice of Appeal on June 18 as set forth above..
During the course of the trial and cross-examination
of Doctor Gary F. Larsen, defense counsel attempted to set forth
a hypothet not in evidence, to wit:

that at the time of the

accident Mr. Freis indicated that he did not feel the impact
of the defendant's truck.

Plaintiff's counsel objected to the

use of such evidence or statement not in evidence which was
overruled pending defense counsel's ability to tie in later on.
He was able to illicit out of Doctor Larsen that if plaintiff
indicated no history of feeling any impact in the accident that
likely he would not have been injured on the 23rd of January

-21-

1973 in the accident. (Tr. p. 235 Ins. 20-30; p. 236 Ins.
1-26)
Thereafter, the defense called Mr. Norval Millsap to
the witness stand and put the question to him as to what
was stated by the plaintiff concerning the impact of defenc
ant's truck.

(Tr. p. 331 Ins. 2-6)

Before an answer was

given, plaintiff's counsel requested to voir-dire the
witness and thereby showed the court that the witness did
not know whom was making the statements to him at the time
concerning the impact of defendant's vehicle.

(Tr. p. 331

Ins. 9-30, p. 332 Ins. 1-12)
Direct examination resumed as Mr. Berry guaranteed
that he would be able to put it together.

Counsel again

failed to illicit from Mr. Millsap as to whom he was talkii
to.

Again Mr. Barnes objected to the admission of the

testimony stating that there was no proper foundation
necessary to know specifically as to whom was speaking.
Mr. Berry then stated that at the time of the declaration
if the plaintiff did not object to the statement being mad<
by Mr. Dinger he automatically adopts whatever is said. M:
Barnes disagreed saying that two people in a general locat:
while one is speaking need not speak in order to be on a
differing opinion.

The court agreed and sustained plain-

tiff fs:objection.

-22-

Again Mr. Berry tried as he asked what was said by
Mr. Dinger.

The witness stated that he was not sure.

Then again Mr. Berry asked about what was said about the
collision by Mr. Freis and again the witness said he was
not sure which one made any statements.
objected.

Again Mr. Barnes

Again the witness stated that he couldn't

specifically remember with whom he was carrying on the
conversation.
The court warned that if the witness could not recall
who was speaking to him that the testimony could not be
used on the area.

Again Defense Counsel attempted to speak

generically about what the two, Mr. Dinger and Mr. Freis,
were saying by using the word M they n .

Mr. Barnes again

objected to the use of the word "they11 insisting that who
is speaking must be specified.

The court agreed whereupon

Mr. Berry asked that the jury be excused for a minute.
While the jury was recessed, counsel proffered evidence
of the statement,

The witness stated that he could not

honestly recall which one of them made the statement and
testified about the conversation as follows:

He, Mr.

Millsap, had said, '" I guess you got shook up pretty bad'
or something to that effect,'When the truck — other truck
hit,' and one of them replied, 'We didn't--I didn't even
feel the truck hit.

All I heard was a lot of racket.

I

looked out the window and there went the mirror,'n (Note
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that this statement was not a statement of a witness where
a party is being identified as having stated it, but is
merely a statement of a person at the scene of the acciden
designated as "I") Again the witness stated that he didn1
know who had made the statement.

Mr. Barnes protested tha

because the person can't be identified it becomes very
prejudicial.
The court stated that if Mr. Freis had made the state
ment, it would be an admission of a party.

If Mr. Dinger

said it it would be hearsay stating, MThatfs the way I
see it Mr. Berry.

I don't know how else I can look at it.'

Mr. Berry continued concerning his theory of adoption by
not denying it and threatened that if it were not let in
it would be grounds for a new trial.

The court stated tha

it was not afraid of those grounds.
The court then suggested that Mr. Dinger be called
and be asked if he had said it, whereupon iMr, Dinger was
returned to the v/itness stand and direct examination began
Mr. Dinger in answer to the question put said, f,I said
nothing to Millsap about the mirror and I donft recall Mr.
Freis saying anything/1

Mr. Berry argued that he had elim

nated Mr. Dinger and that left Mr. Freis as the declarant.
#

•

,

"

•

•

The court rejected that argument, but asked Mr. Barne:
if he didn't want something of error in the record.
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Mr.

Barnes asked that it not be left for him to appeal upon.
Mr. Berry then insisted that he could provide authority on
the question, whereupon counsel retired with the court to
chambers and attempted to find some authority.

During the

course of the recess, Mr. Berry failed in his effort to
obtain the necessary authorities as is set forth in the
affidavit of plaintiff's counsel in support of the Motion
for a New Trial.

(At R. p. 169-170)

During the recess and after the argument in chambers,
defense counsel still refused to accept the court's ruling.
The court, however, in chambers promised that if Mr. Mill sap
could be reasonably certain as to who was making the statement it would be let in.

Defense Counsel then approached Mr.

Millsap in the hall and instructed him as to what he must
say on the witness stand informing him that it would only
be necessary for him to conclude that since Mr. Dinger had
denied in his testimony that he was the declarant that he
could therefore reasonably place the statement as one having
been made by Mr. Freis.

(R. p. 170 para. 8)

Thereafter the court resumed session and the witness,
Mr. Norval Millsap, was returned to the witness stand.

As

the questions were again asked Mr. Barnes again objected
whereupon the court asked the witness if he was reasonably
certain who it was that had replied to him with regard to
the conversation.

The witness stated, "Based upon Mr.
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Dinger's statement, yes, sir."

The court then overruled

plaintiff's objection and directed counsel to go ahead.
Whereupon, the witness answered, VI am reasonably certain
that Mr. Freis stated that when I asked him if it didn't
shake him up when the truck hit him and he replied, !I
didn't feel the thing hit.

I just heard a lot of racket,

looked out the window and there went the mirror. '!f (Tr.
pp. 331-343 ending on line 28)
A very brief study of the record will show that Mr.
Millsap was mistaken in that both Mr. Freis in his testim
before the jury and Mr. Dinger in his testimony denied
having talked to Mr. Millsap concerning any part of the
collision or the impact of defendant's truck.

The final

testimony given by Mr. Millsap lacked a proper foundation
because he stated, "Based upon Mr. Dinger's statement, ye
sir."

I would remind the court that Mr. Dinger's stateme

was not made before the jury, but was made during recess
the jury

and therefore an improper foundation was made.

That places the whole thing back where it started from.
As the court reasoned on p. 337 Ins. 16-19

If Mr. Freis

made the statement, it would be an admission of the party
and therefore, an exception to the hearsay rule.

If Mr.

Dinger, however, made the statement it would be hearsay
because it would be an out-of-court statement which is ma
other than by a witness while testifying at a hearing
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which is being offered
asserted.

to prove the truth of the matter

(See rule 63 of the Rules of Evidence adopted

by the S. Ct. of Utah February 17, 1971 p. 39.

See testi-

monies given by Mr. Freis and Mr. Dinger in which both
denied having discussed the impact with Mr. Millsap p. 343
Ins. 14-15; p. 339 Ins. 7-10; p. 302 Ins. 17-18)
Doctor Thomas D. Noonan after giving a very similar
history concerning plaintiff's injury to that of Doctor
Gary F. Larsen was asked what his opinion as to the cause
of plaintiff's condition would be if Mr. Millsap testified
and indicated that Mr. Freis had stated at the time of the
accident that he hadn't even felt the impact of the collision.
The doctor testified that it would indicate to him that Mr.
Freis had not suffered any injury at the time and that Mr.
Freis' condition is a result of the chronic condition of
arthritis.

(jr. p. 402 Ins. 8-16)

Obviously the use of Mr. Mi 11 sap's testimony and the
admission of the said testimonies over plaintiff's objection
was very prejudicial in this case in that it would tend to
negate the histories reported by the doctors concerning the
accident and the effect thereof.

Since Mr. Millsap could

not identify the declarant and since it was possible that
the two individuals, Mr. Freis and Mr. Dinger, could have
experience the impact differently, the admission of Mr.

L. I

Millsap's testimony was crucial to the outcome of the
case.
Mr. Freis was sitting behind the driver's wheel with
his back to the door and corner that received the most
impact as indicated on Exhibit D-23 in a relaxed position,
(Tr. p. 188 Ins. 21-30; p. 189 Ins. 1-17), while Mr. Dinge
was in a very rigid braced situation stretched out attempt
to put his pants on.

(Tr. p. 309 Ins. 23-30)

The experic

of the two men could have been entirely different under tl
circumstances.
The failure to lay the proper foundation prohibited
the questions put to Millsap because:
1.

The situation may not have called for a reply, o

2.

There was no evidence that the plaintiff heard o

understood such a statement, or,
3. The plaintiff was not aware at the time that he
had an interest in the statement being made because the
onset of pain did not begin immediately, or,
4.

He was not in the physical or mental position tc

deny such a statement since he felt no immediate effects
at the time the statement was being made.
Before defendant can use silence as an admission he
must first prove one of the above which he did not do.
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On the other hand, no admission can be implied
from silence where the failure to answer was caused
by constraint, or where the party was not aware at
the time he had an interest, or was only indirectly
affected, or where when the matter was presented he
had no interest to object. 31A C.J.S. Evidence,
Sec. 295 p. 757
The doctrine of adoptive silence does not apply
if the party is in such physical or mental condition
that a reply could not be reasonably expected from
him. Southers v. Savage, 191 C.A. 2d 100, 12 Cal.
Rptr. 470." See also SrnijUi v. Beard 56 Wyo. 37 5, 110
P. 2d 260.
That these type of inquires are preliminary and necessa
in the foundation of such questions is supported by the
following:
Statements made by a party may be proved by other
witnesses when such statements are against the party's
interest, but if it is thus sought to impeach a party,
a proper foundation must be laid for the impeaching
questions. Kitchel v. Gallagher, 126 Or. 3 73, 2 70 P.
488
The admissibility of a tacit admission
allegedly arising from the silence of a person
concerning a statement made in his presence
and hearing is dependant upon whether the
circumstances surrounding the making of the
statement were such as to naturally cause
for denial which is a preliminary question
for the trial court to be determined in view
of all the evidences in the case. 29 Am Jur
2d, Evidence, Sect. 636 p. 689. Also see
Klcver v. Elliott, 212 Or. 490, 320 P. 2d 263,
70 A.L.R. 2d 1094
Very basic, however, is the fact that before a statement can be admissible against a party that party must be
identified as the declarant.
In any event, before a purported statement
of a party is admissible against him, it is
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necessary to identify the declarant as the
party. . .Kunk. vs. Howell, 4 0 Tenn. App.
183, 289 S.W. 874, 73 A.L.R. 2d 1304.
CONCLUSION
The trial court erred in refusing to grant plaintiff's
Motion for a Directed Verdict, Motion for a Judgment N.O.V.,
or in the Alternative for a New Trial.

Moreover, the

verdict of the jury in the case was against the weight and
preponderance of the evidence and clearly erroneous.

The

trial court further erred in admitting into evidence the
testimony of Mr. Norval Millsap without a proper foundation
being laid in that the said statement fortified the hypothetical questions and responses being put by Mr. Berry
throughout the trial to Doctor Gary F. Larsen and Doctor
Thomas D. Noonan.

This Court should reverse the judgment

of the trial court and remand the case to the district
court for appropriate proceedings.
Respectfully submitted,

J^
rnes
Attorney for Appellant
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